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1	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
2	RICHMOND DIVISION
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4	ePLUS, INC., :
5	Plaintiff, : v. : Civil Action
6	: No. 3:09CV620 LAWSON SOFTWARE, INC.,
7	: March 14, 2013 Defendant. :
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10	COMPLETE TRANSCRIPT OF CONFERENCE CALL
11	BEFORE THE HONORABLE ROBERT E. PAYNE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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16	APPEARANCES: (Via telephone)
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23	DIANE J. DAFFRON, RPR OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
24	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
25	APPEARANCES: (Continuing)

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(The proceedings in this matter commenced at 10:00 AM via conference call.)

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THE COURT: Hello. This is ePlus v. Lawson, civil 3:09CV620. Who is here for whom, please?

MR. MERRITT: Craig Merritt and Paul Jacobs

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MR. STRAPP: Michael Strapp for ePlus.

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MS. ALBERT: Jennifer Albert for ePlus.

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MR. YOUNG: And David Young for ePlus.

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MR. CARR: Judge, this is Dabney Carr for

THE COURT: All right. I gave the order,

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Lawson Software.

for ePlus.

13 14 MR. THOMASCH: Your Honor, this is Dan

Thomasch for Lawson Software. And with me in the

conference room are Josh Krevitt, Chris Dusseault and

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Richard Mark.

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Docket No. 1019, to solicit your views. I know you

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have a brief still coming, ePlus, but I have long

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thought that given the nature of the modifications

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that might be required because of the scope of Federal

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Circuit's order, that it would likely be that it would

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be appropriate to just reassess the injunction de novo

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with a view, keeping in mind, of course, the previous

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findings that had been made that led to the first

injunction and making sure that it was equitable to have an injunction go forward.

You-all took the view in your original papers, I think, that I should just modify the injunction to delete certain functionalities and equipment. Or modules, I guess it is. That was in the statements of position that you all filed at my request.

And then Lawson wanted to keep the whole -said I didn't have jurisdiction to do anything until
the mandate was issued. When the mandate was issued,
Mr. Robertson had passed away a couple of days before
that, and we were, as I understood it, to keep things
in abeyance until you-all sorted things out.

And then I asked for a conference call. We talked about it, but I didn't talk about that issue --we talked about how to proceed on the contempt citation, but we didn't talk about the injunction.

Also by that time Lawson had filed a motion to dissolve or modify the injunction, Docket No. 1011, but there had been no response to it. And I thought it wise to get that whole topic on the table for discussion at this stage.

I think I know your views, Mr. Thomasch, from the papers. I read your motion or your brief in

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support of the motion that you think this needs to be decided right away.

Mr. Merritt, who's going to speak for ePlus?
MR. MERRITT: Michael Strapp is, Your Honor.

MR. STRAPP: Your Honor, this is Michael Strapp.

All right.

THE COURT:

Regarding the contempt hearing, it's our position that it should move forward as scheduled and that there's no need to hold things up or have some preliminary hearing, especially not a preliminary evidentiary hearing to resolve the Rule 60(b) motion filed by Lawson.

We will respond to the motion with an opposition paper on Monday, and we expect that the positions we set forth will reiterate in some respects and expand in other respects the positions we had set forth in our original position statement after the Federal Circuit decision was handed down to respond directly to some of the new arguments that are raised in Lawson's Rule 60(b) motion.

But if the call today is primarily to discuss the order of operations, in other words, how we get things done, how we resolve both the Rule 60(b) motion and keep the contempt hearing on track, we think it's

important to point out that a possible motive -- I don't want to impute motives, but a possible implication of Lawson's motion is that Lawson wishes to trigger a ruling on the motion so that that ruling would then be appealable, and that an appeal taken by Lawson could be leveraged, I don't know whether successfully or not, but as a means to stay the contempt hearing and to delay this matter from being resolved. And that's something that we certainly do not want to occur. We've obviously been waiting --

THE COURT: Let me deal with that. I don't contemplate not having the contempt hearing. I contemplate dealing with Lawson's motion and giving you an opportunity, as required under the rules, to deal with it, and brief it, and then to give them an opportunity to respond to it. And it's obviously going to take some time to think about it and sort it out, but I'm planning on going on with the contempt hearing. And I'm asking you whether either before that or after that, but in short order, it's a good idea, or you-all want any evidentiary hearing to put on the reasons why you should have an injunction or what shape the injunction should take.

MR. STRAPP: So with respect to the specific question of whether or not there should be an

evidentiary hearing, it's our position that Lawson carries a heavy burden here on this Rule 60(b) motion. That's the case law as interpreted by the Fourth Circuit and the Federal Circuit. Many cases talk about it being an extraordinary burden to modify or dissolve an injunction that's already in place, which make sense from a matter of policy perspective. You wouldn't want to have someone who is enjoined showing up at the courtroom door every month asking for the injunction to be changed. And high threshold standards prevent that from happening.

And because Lawson bears a heavy burden here to prevail on its Rule 60(b) motion, we think that this can be decided on the papers.

We think especially in light of the Federal Circuit's decision, and in particular the very last two sentences of that decision, which says that the Federal Circuit is remanding to the District Court to consider what changes are required to the terms of the injunction consistent with its opinion, and in all other respects affirming the decision.

We think that that's a limited mandate and a limited directive to Your Honor, that that directive serves only to consider whether or not the injunction needs to be changed consistent with the decisions that

were made by the Federal Circuit.

THE COURT: That is exactly what it says, and I understand that, but my question is: Do I need an evidentiary with regard to how it ought to be modified consistent with the opinion? That's all. I'm not proposing to start all over again in life.

The Federal Circuit has ruled, but that ruling has to be viewed in perspective of the substance that led to and the findings in the injunction order and the substance of the Federal Circuit's decision.

And then what they said is, Okay, now you've got an injunction here, and you've got some things that are no longer valid in the judgment and some things that are. And so you have to decide how you're going to -- I've forgotten the exact language, but they told us what to do, and that's what needs to be done.

Don't overreact to everything. I'm trying to sort out the simple issue of whether or not (A) anybody wants an evidentiary hearing, is it needed, and when we can have it. And I would like to have it as soon as possible if it is needed.

MR. STRAPP: The simple answer to that question is we do not believe an evidentiary hearing

is necessary.

THE COURT: All right. And, Mr. Thomasch, how about you?

MR. THOMASCH: Your Honor, if I could respond briefly to the predicate point that Mr. Strapp made.

Obviously, we're not just here under the Rule 60 motion. We're here under the mandate from the Federal Circuit as well.

The type of heavy burden that Mr. Strapp is talking about would come into play if what we were saying was that circumstances between the parties had changed. For instance, if we said, ePlus now is just a patent troll. They are a nonpracticing entity. And for that reason, we think that the injunction should be dissolved going forward. We'd have a heavy burden to make that test to show those changed circumstances.

Here this is fundamentally different. Here the Federal Circuit has already demonstrated the changed circumstances because the Federal Circuit has said that the system claims that so heavily undergridded the finding that an injunction was appropriate under the four-factor test, the Federal Circuit has said those claims are invalid.

THE COURT: Yeah, but it didn't say what you just said either. So you need to be careful what you

say.

I understand, I think, what I need to do here. You may have gotten your cart before the horse simply by filing a motion. But now you've filed a motion, you're going to have to live with the consequences of it. And I'll have to sort that out. But I'm obligated to do what the Federal Circuit told me to do.

And I guess my simple question for you is:

Do you think you need an evidentiary hearing? And if so, when do you want to have it and what's the contours? So we can make some plans and get some things done on your motion or for me to satisfy what the Federal Circuit asked me to do.

That's all I'm trying to get accomplished here right now.

MR. THOMASCH: I understand, Your Honor. We do not require an evidentiary hearing because the Court has never previously been asked to consider whether it would be appropriate to base an injunction solely on the findings of infringement of method claim 26 or if there was an injunction based on that one method claim, what the scope of that injunction would be.

Since that hasn't been decided, we believe

that if the plaintiff wants a burden on that basis and not with the benefit of the system claims that they had to benefit them before, they would need to make that showing at a hearing. If they don't make that showing at a hearing, we don't believe an injunction can lie. We believe it has to be vacated ab initio, but in any set of circumstances, Your Honor, so we don't feel there's anything for us to come forward with if they're not coming forward first, and so we're not requesting that hearing, Your Honor.

THE COURT: It's your motion. Wait a minute. It's your motion. And you have a motion that you filed. And I'm hearing you say you don't want a hearing on the evidentiary hearing. So that's all right.

MR. THOMASCH: Oral argument, but not an evidentiary hearing.

THE COURT: All right. So neither one of you want it.

And, Mr. Strapp, you are aware of his argument that you haven't shown in the record any basis for an injunction based on that which remains after the Fourth Circuit's decision. You're aware that that's his argument?

MR. STRAPP: We are aware of that argument,

and I think we'll respond in the papers that we file on Monday to that argument. And the response is obviously simple, that the record has been laid and was laid extensively two years ago, and that that record was not directed solely, as Lawson reiterates, to system claims, but rather the record is replete with references to the method claims, including claim 26.

THE COURT: Yes, but given what the Federal Circuit did and how they've teed up the issue, you're going to have to specifically address how the record supports an injunction as if the only finding of infringement had been that which was sustained. Do you understand that? Do you understand that?

MR. STRAPP: That's not consistent with my understanding.

THE COURT: Well, I'm going to tell you it's consistent with mine that you're going to have to address that question. You can make other arguments, but that's one you need to make. Whatever you want to present is your business, and I'm not trying to limit you, but I am saying that that's an issue that he's teed up and that I need to have your advices on. That's all.

MR. STRAPP: Okay. We will definitely

respond to that issue in full in the papers that we file on Monday, but if you would indulge me just to make one point here.

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. STRAPP: I think that the notion that a party who filed a Rule 60(b) motion can simply by its say-so shift the burden to the opposing party and say that that party opposing the Rule 60(b) motion somehow has the burden of proof in production to come forward with evidence to show that the Rule 60(b) motion should be denied simply turns everything that I know about civil procedure on its head.

Mr. Thomasch would have been really well advised to have held his powder and not to have filed this motion. But I think he thought that I was asleep and wasn't paying any attention to the case simply because I had adhered to his instruction that there wasn't any jurisdiction to entertain the issue while the mandate was pending, and that right before the mandate came out, Mr. Robertson died, and we agreed to hold everything off until you-all sorted out what you-all wanted to do in perspective of the loss of the lead lawyer in the case. And then I did take a week's vacation. I went to take my wife on a birthday trip

for a week and directed while I was gone to set up a conference call so we could sort out where we were going from here, having not heard from either one of you.

Now, if I'm to deal with a motion, I'll have to deal with the whole body of law that deals with the motion, but I also have to deal with the mandate of the Federal Circuit. And that may involve a different approach to matters about who has what burdens, when, and where. But in either event, I've got a task to do and I'm just trying to sort out how it is that we're going to do it.

And he has, in fact, teed up an issue, and that is that the record does not support the issuance of an injunction based solely on the infringement claims that were sustained and left in effect.

And however else you want to deal with your response to his motion, I do need you to address that point.

MR. STRAPP: Understood, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And I realize how he's addressed it and the fashion he's addressed it in his motion. He'll have to live or die by the way he did it in perspective of what you say and what he files in his reply.

So, basically, what I'm hearing is you-all are happy to have this go forward on the papers, that I do not need to schedule an evidentiary hearing, that I can get your briefs and go from there to satisfy the mandate and/or to decide the motion of Lawson.

Is that what I'm understanding, Mr. Strapp?
MR. STRAPP: Yes, that's our opposition.

THE COURT: And, Mr. Thomasch, that's yours, too?

MR. THOMASCH: Yes, Your Honor. Might I add that we certainly did not think Your Honor was asleep in any way.

THE COURT: Oh, Mr. Thomasch, come on. You don't need to respond to everything.

MR. THOMASCH: I understand, Your Honor.

What I want to do is just underscore one thing about the timing issue and the like. We believe because the issue here is not whether this is just changed circumstances have made it wrong for this to proceed, for the injunction to proceed as is going forward.

The fundamental position we have is because the patent claims in large respect were invalid, the system claims were invalid, because of that if the proper set of facts had been understood, the Court would not have entered any injunction at all in 2011.

And then because of that, the entire situation needs to be reevaluated under the four-factor test in light of the one claim that was valid and infringed, which is a method claim.

And we feel it's critical that the issue be resolved before the contempt proceeding for two reasons:

(1) If the Court agrees with us that the injunction -- had the Court been aware that the system claims were invalid and that only the method claim 26 was infringed, if the Court had had that set of facts before it on the record before it, we believe that no injunction would have issued, in which case there can be no contempt proceeding, the same way there can't be a contempt proceeding with regard to Configuration 2 in light of the invalidity of the claim that underscores that configuration.

Secondly --

THE COURT: I understand that. Let me resolve that.

We are going to have the contempt hearing. I will have the briefs on the other issues. I'll have the briefs on those issues. The order in which I decide things will be something that you all can sort out and deal with, but I want to hear the evidence and

get it done. There's been enough delay in this case anyway.

This is not the only situation on the docket, and it needs to be resolved, and I need to have it sorted out, and so do both of you so that you can get on with your lives, your clients.

MR. THOMASCH: It's Mr. Thomasch. If I might add one small point. And that is, independent of whether an injunction should exist is the question of the scope. And the parties are in complete disagreement as to whether, under any set of circumstances, if Mr. Strapp is right about everything, we still believe as a matter of law that the products, because they have substantial non-infringing uses, are not subject to an injunction against their sale. All the damages for the injunction proceeding would be, I'm sorry, for the contempt proceeding, would be affected by the scope of any injunction as well as whether there is an injunction.

THE COURT: They might or might not. Let's get the record straight, Mr. Thomasch. Let's just get the record straight. Then we'll go from there.

MR. THOMASCH: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: You all are ready to try the

case. Let's get that tried. These are matters that are actually raised in your papers.

MR. THOMASCH: Yes, Your Honor. And we would ask for oral argument on the injunction if we could.

THE COURT: I'll schedule that. I'll probably schedule all the oral arguments at the same time. I don't know. I have to wait and see what everybody says before I sort that out.

My only objective today was truly to find out whether we needed to have an evidentiary hearing and to get it scheduled as promptly as possible.

I did not know the extent to which you would use the same, if you required it, the same hearing on the injunction, whether you would use the same people you had in mind using in the contempt hearing. And if possible, I was hopeful of saving everybody time and effort in the process of hearing everybody on the topics at the same time that they were all here. That is the witnesses. But I don't need to worry about that now because neither one of you think that an evidentiary hearing is necessary on the injunction.

All right. Anything else? Is there anything else that needs to be decided that's left to be decided, left open here on this record preparatory to deciding the contempt? Are there any motions that are

pending?

I thought I had asked you-all to prepare a list of those things and I didn't get anything. So I need to double check what it is that's left open, if anything. Is there anything pending from your standpoint, Mr. Strapp?

MR. STRAPP: Well, Your Honor, the only motions that I recall that haven't yet been resolved were motions that were taken up in February of 2012. You may recall that both parties filed a series of motions in limine to exclude certain testimony from the experts that were going to be testifying at the contempt hearing that was scheduled to take place last year.

And the one ruling that Your Honor did make was to exclude portions of Dr. Putnam's testimony. That's Lawson's remedies expert. And you excluded him from offering any testimony on his reasonable royalty opinion. But other than that, you addressed the issues at the hearing. I don't think you ever issued a formal ruling, but I'm not sure that one is required because I think you gave the parties guidelines about what would and wouldn't be permitted from the experts at the hearing.

THE COURT: So you're saying there are

pending some motions in limine. Can you give me a list of those so I can make sure I know what to double check on?

MR. STRAPP: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: You think those can be, whatever they are, you're saying you think they can be denied as moot?

MR. STRAPP: Well, no. I think Your Honor has -- didn't issue a formal order on those motions except with respect to the motion as to Dr. Putman, but that Your Honor gave the parties guidance that's on the transcript of that hearing record that will inform how the hearing goes forward with respect to expert testimony in April.

THE COURT: All right. Give me the date of that hearing also so I'll be on the same page you-all are.

MR. STRAPP: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: It's probably got a docket number.

All right. Mr. Thomasch, are you in agreement with him on that?

MR. THOMASCH: I am in agreement with Mr.

Strapp with respect to the liability experts. I think
you were very, very clear, and I believe that there

will be dramatically reduced testimony from the liability experts on both sides.

There was a ruling with respect to

Dr. Putnam, our damages expert. There was a motion

filed with regard to Dr. Ugone, ePlus's expert. I do

believe that motion does need to be decided.

The others, I believe, your instructions to both parties are totally sufficient and the testimony has been truncated by the subsequent events anyway.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. STRAPP: Your Honor, the docket number, I have it here, it's Docket No. 943, and that's the transcript of the contempt motions hearing that took place on February 29, 2012.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. THOMASCH: So the only open motion from Lawson's perspective, Your Honor, is the motion with respect to the opinions of Mr. Ugone, but I don't think either side needs the liability experts decided because I think your instructions covered those in detail.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Strapp, are you in agreement that the Ugone motion needs to be decided?

MR. STRAPP: Well, I don't think that Your

Honor did decide that issue. Just to refresh you of what that was about.

Dr. Ugone had an opinion about disgorgement as a matter of damages. Whether it's disgorgement of profits, gross profits, net profits, that was a dispute between the parties. And Lawson's argument was that Dr. Ugone should not be able to testify about disgorgement. So that was the subject of that motion. And I think Mr. Thomasch is correct that that was never decided by Your Honor.

THE COURT: So it needs to be decided. He just said it needs to be decided. You agree.

MR. DUSSEAULT: Your Honor, this is Chris Dusseault for Lawson, if I could just clarify.

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. DUSSEAULT: The motion of Dr. Ugone had two parts. It was a motion to exclude his testimony in whole for failing to take proper account of whether there was actual harm to ePlus. It also argued alternatively that it should be excluded in part based on the particular approach to cost savings that he took. And neither one of those arguments has been decided yet.

THE COURT: Do you agree, Mr. Strapp, they need to be decided?

MR. STRAPP: Yes. And let me just mention, 1 2 though, with respect to the specifics of the motion. 3 Part of the motion was about the cost savings opinion. Dr. Ugone -- and both parties have offered 4 5 supplemental damages reports in light of additional financial information. In a supplemental report of 6 7 Dr. Ugone, he did not address the cost savings, and he does not intend to address that at the hearing. So I 8 9 think the motion is moot as to that part of Dr. Ugone's opinions. 10

MR. DUSSEAULT: This is Chris Dusseault, Your Honor.

If they'll agree that Dr. Ugone will not address the cost savings approach, that's certainly satisfactory to us on that piece of the motion.

THE COURT: I think you just agreed to that, didn't you, Mr. Strapp?

MR. STRAPP: Yes.

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THE COURT: Good. So we don't deal with that.

All right. Well, we'll get on that and get to work on it. Is there anything else that needs to be done? Okay. I'll await your papers on the responses to all this.

Now, are you all okay on pages and everything

else, both of you? You can deal with it in the 1 2 standard page limits; is that right? MR. STRAPP: I think that is true, Your 3 Honor, we should be able to fit it within the page 4 limits. 5 MR. THOMASCH: And we will do the same with 6 7 our reply, Your Honor. 8 THE COURT: All right. That's fine. Thank 9 you all very much. 10 MR. THOMASCH: Thank you, Your Honor. 11 THE COURT: All right. Bye. 12 (The proceedings were adjourned at 3:33 PM.) 13 I, Diane J. Daffron, certify that the 14 foregoing is a correct transcript from the record of 15 16 proceedings in the above-entitled matter. 17 /s/ 18 DIANE J. DAFFRON, RPR, CCR DATE 19 20 21 22 23 24

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